Beyond the fraud triangle: Swiss and Austrian elite fraudsters by Levi, Michael & Schuchter, Alexander
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/88158/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Levi, Michael and Schuchter, Alexander 2015. Beyond the fraud triangle: Swiss and Austrian elite
fraudsters. Accounting Forum 39 (3) , pp. 176-187. 10.1016/j.accfor.2014.12.001 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.12.001
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.12.001>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
Title Page (including Author Details) 
 
 
 
 
Beyond the Fraud Triangle 
 
 
 
Swiss and Austrian elite fraudsters 
 
In Accounting Forum 39 (3), pp. 176-187. DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2014.12.001 
 
Alexander Schuchtera,* and Michael Levib,1 
a University of St.Gallen, School of Management, Dufourstrasse 50, 9000 St.Gallen, Switzerland 
b Cardiff University, School of Social Sciences, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3WT, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +41 762 728 940. 
E-mail addresses: alexander.schuchter@unisg.ch (A. Schuchter), levi@cf.ac.uk (M. Levi). 
1 Tel.: +44 793 055 1160. 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
11 
*Manuscript (with Author Details removed)  
 
1 
 
 
1 Beyond the Fraud Triangle 
2    
3 
4 Swiss and Austrian elite fraudsters 
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7 
8 
9 
10 1. Introduction 
12 
13 
14 The content of rules, auditing standards and criminal laws is constantly changing over time 
15 
16 and jurisdiction: thus, the framework within which the label of „fraud‟ is attached is relative from a 
17 legal as well as from a social point of view (Sutherland, 1939). Attempts to generate – explicitly or 
18 
19 implicitly  –  a  universal  definition  and  demarcation  of  "fraud"  invariably  generate  boundary 
20 disputes. Under the interdisciplinary and multifaceted concept of fraud, we generally mean a 
21 
22 criminal violation of financial trust (Cressey, 1950; Sutherland, 1941). White-collar criminals, 
23 
24 sometimes called “trust violators”, commit fraud in a business environment, usually without any 
25 physical  force,  and  confer  an  illegal  economic  advantage  for  themselves  and/or  for  their 
26 
27 organisation. According to our paper, the illicit behaviour of our convicted Swiss and Austrian 
28 fraudsters in the course of their occupational activities (or by abuse of their authority to dispose of 
29 
30 corporate assets) causes serious tangible and intangible damage. Explanations for why some 
31 
32 individuals do not follow certain rules under adverse conditions and others do still provoke debate 
33 in accounting, criminology and in other fields of research. 
34 
35 Offenders‟  perspectives  on  the  elements  of  the  Fraud  Triangle  (FT)  –  opportunities, 
36 motivations  and  rationalisations  –  have  received  little  analytical  attention  and,  though  their 
37 
38 perspectives do not have an exclusive claim on authenticity, they are worthy of our interest. 
39 
40 Several risk factors of different fraud standards are predicated on the FT (Cohen et al., 2010; Lou 
41 & Wang, 2009; Murphy, 2012).1 The FT is a sub-set of the more generic Crime Triangle, and 
42 
43 though it focuses us away from broader issues of the non-incrimination of privileged business 
44 
45 
 
 
46 
47 Non standard abbreviations include: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE); American Institute of 
48 Certified Public Accountants (AICPA); Auditing Standard (AS); Chief Executive Officers (CEOs); European 
49 Academic Software Award (EASA); Fraud Triangle (FT); Institut Der Wirtschaftspruefer (Institute of Public Auditors  in  Germany)  (IDW);  International  Federation  of  Accountants  (IFAC);  International  Standard  on 
50 Auditing  (ISA);  Money  Ideology  Coercion  Ego  (M.I.C.E.);  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Board 
51 (PCAOB); Pruefungsstandard (Auditing Standard) (PS); Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS); white-collar 
52 criminal (WCC). 
53 
1 The fraud risk factors‟ relevance is acknowledged by American standards, [see Auditing Standard (AS) No. 5 
54 (PCAOB, 2007) or Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 82 (AICPA, 1997)] as well as by other international 
55 auditing standards [Pruefungsstandard (PS) 210 (IDW, 2006), International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240 or 
56 ISA 250 (IFAC, 2013)]. The Statement on Auditing Standards, SAS 99 (AICPA, 2002), “categorizes these 
57 factors according to the fraud triangle” (Wilks & Zimbelman, 2004, p. 723; Donegan & Ganon, 2008; Norman, 
58 2010). Most recently, the AICPA redrafted SAS, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” 
59 (Dorminey et al., 2012) to enhance the clarity of drafting conventions and to converge with ISAs (effective for 
60 audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December 15, 2012). According to the AICPA, the 
61 clarified SAS does not change or expand SAS 99 in any significant respect (AICPA, 2012). 
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elites (Barak, 2012; Friedrichs, 2009)2, it is commonly used in academic and professional circles 
1 as a heuristic framework for explaining fraud. Fraud courses are rare in business schools (Choo 
2 
3 & Tan, 2007), especially before the financial crisis: nevertheless, though awareness alone might 
4 not have prevented the corporate excesses that led to the crisis, it has been asserted that “every 
6 corporate executive needs to understand the fraud triangle” (Biegelman & Bartow, 2006, p. 33). 
7 
8 The fundamental sociological conception of how we construct the motivation to commit a 
9 crime is found in the academic contributions of C. Wright Mills (1940) and Donald R. Cressey 
10 
11 (1953), who note “that motives are not biological drives which „cause‟ us to act in certain ways”; 
12 but  this  is  only  part  of  the  explanation  of  why  and  where  offending  happens  (Shover  & 
14 Hochstetler, 2006). Differences in organisational as well as societal culture might be expected to 
15 
16 play some part in regulating behaviour, because even within different capitalist societies and 
17 groups,  there  are  variations  in  what  forms  of  business  (mis)conduct  are  acceptable  and 
18 
19 unacceptable. One of the competitive advantages of Switzerland (and perhaps to a lesser extent 
20
 3 
21 
Austria) is a high reputation for discreet and honest guardianship of funds, however acquired. 
22 
The preservation of that reputation is a central political and social objective, which is threatened 
23 
24 by fraud or at least by beliefs that there is a “significant risk” of fraud, especially of fraud by 
25 bankers  and  other  trusted  persons.  Within  that  framework,  one  might  expect  a  strong 
26 
27 understanding that fraud will be firmly reacted to (formally and/or informally), and thus – for those 
28 wedded to social respectability and to remaining within the country or social group – this should 
30 constrain people‟s willingness to engage in fraud and allied deviant behaviour, provided that they 
31 
32 define what they are doing as the sort of behaviour that will be both detected and reacted to as 
33 fraud.  Though  more  than  offenders‟  childhoods  (Piquero  &  Moffitt,  2014)  or  personality 
34 
35 characteristics (Babiak & Hare, 2007), these sociocultural factors cannot readily be altered; but 
36 organisations are able to change their institutional  framework  to remove some cultural and 
38 situational stimulants to white-collar crime. 
39 
40 This  article  provides  an  opportunity  to  examine  white-collar  offending  with  insights  from 
41 offenders  themselves,  primarily  from  our  original  research  in  Austria  and  German-speaking 
42 
43 Switzerland, but also more generally. First, we provide a theoretical discussion of the initial 
44 development of the FT and its elements, including the significant work that has followed. This 
46 framework is next in fame to Edwin Sutherland‟s differential association (1939; Cressey, 1954), 
47 
48 and perhaps to a lesser extent to strain as well as to coercion theory (Colvin et al., 2002; 
49 Donegan & Ganon, 2008), as a model for identifying the conditions under which white-collar 
50 
51 crime may occur and for explaining fraud in organisations. Since the triangle has received 
52 
53 
54 
2 Like situational crime prevention generally, it takes for granted the legal framework, which itself is the creation 
55 of a political process affected by campaign financing and lobbying: a particularly important issue when we 
56 consider crimes that affect the interests of capitalist firms, though intra-capitalist conflicts should not be
 
57 ignored in making sense of the criminalisation process. 
58 
3 The principal exception to this is the hotly disputed allegations about what Swiss banks did with “Nazi gold” 
59 taken from the Jews (Bower, 1997). This is not to contest that part of the historic popularity of Switzerland, 
60 and to a lesser extent Austria, as a haven for international funds was also its banking secrecy provisions, 
61 which later was transmuted in public discourse to „customer confidentiality‟. 
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institutional recognition, international scientific management papers have increasingly focused on 
1 it. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) expand the FT to a quadrangle named Fraud Diamond by 
2 
3 including  an  additional  element:  The  capability  to  commit  fraud. 4  The  Fraud  Diamond  or 
4 alternative models, e.g. the fraud scale, the triangle of fraud action, M.I.C.E. etc. (Albrecht et al., 
6 1984; Dorminey et al., 2012; Kranacher et al., 2011) are not relevant to this work. Secondly, we 
7 
8 present the methods of our examination, which was conducted through interviews with convicted 
9 fraudsters. Third and last, building from an offenders‟ perspective, we discuss similarities and 
10 
11 differences between the literature findings and this empirical study. The findings of this study 
12 refine our understandings of the relevance of each FT element and for the manner in which 
14 offenders perceive and evaluate them. Is the FT an adequate explanatory model? Then we 
15 
16 illustrate some implications and suggest intensifying the dialogue with criminological research as 
17 well as other scientific disciplines to enrich fraud accounting research and practice. 
18 
19 
20 2. Theoretical background 
22 
23 
24 Almost 60 years ago Cressey, cited as the most influential developer of the FT – though the 
25 
26 original idea came largely from a European, Svend Riemer (1941) – presented comprehensive 
27 
28 details of the model in his highly regarded book, Other People‟s Money (Cressey, 1953). At that 
29 time, the model, inter alia based on interviews with white-collar offenders, was mainly limited to 
30 
31 embezzlement as a delinquent violation of financial trust (Cressey, 1953).5 During these early 
32 stages in social scientific approaches to explaining white-collar crime, Cressey proved that there 
33 
34 have to be more elements than just a financial incentive to commit fraud. Albrecht et al. (1982, p. 
35 
36 34) follow Cressey (1953) in arguing that all three conditions of the FT are necessary in the 
37 commission of fraud: “There must be (1) a non-sharable problem, (2) an opportunity for trust 
38 
39 violation, and (3) a set of rationalizations that define the behaviour as appropriate in a given 
40 situation”. Loebbecke et al. argue that a material management fraud would be “highly likely” if 
41 
42 there is opportunity, motivation and moral character to commit fraud, and “if any one of the 
43 
44 requirements  is absent,  then  fraud  would  be  deemed  highly unlikely”  (1989, p. 4; Wilks & 
45 Zimbelman, 2004). More recently, the AICPA (2002) quotes the following statement: “When fraud 
46 
47 occurs there are three conditions that must be present: A. Incentive/pressure …B. Opportunity 
48 
49 … C. Attitude/rationalization” (p. 8), echoed by IFAC (2013). Therefore, the FT has become 
50 conventional wisdom. Albrecht and Albrecht (2004) compare the FT with those elements that are 
51 
52 inevitable for fire: oxygen, heat and fuel. “Firefighters know that a fire can be extinguished by 
53 eliminating any one of the three elements” (pp. 20–21). The risk of fire, or fraudulent behaviour in 
54 
55 relation to the FT, can accrue only from interaction between all components. However, these 
56 
57 
58 4 Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) categorise capability into a) position/function, b) brains, c) confidence/ego, d) 
60 5 
61 
coercion skills, e) effective lying and f) immunity to stress. 
The term "Fraud Triangle" does not exist in Cressey's original writings. 
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elements may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for fraud. Indeed contrary to the Fire 
1 Triangle – if there is no oxygen, there can be no fire – the FT elements are substitutable, as 
2 
3 demonstrated in the results of the following study. About 30 years ago, Romney et al. (1980) 
4 depicted this replacement theory. They summarise results of an interdisciplinary two-year study. 
6 According to them, fraud consists of (i) opportunity plus (ii) situational pressure (as a motivation) 
7 
8 plus (iii) personal characteristics, e.g. integrity. They assume an additive combination of the FT 
9 elements: “A fraud could theoretically occur under any situation if a person is motivated enough, 
10 
11 even in the absence of outward opportunities or pressures” (p. 64). Once the sum of these three 
12 major elements has reached a certain magnitude, fraud will occur (though the methodology for 
14 quantifying the elements remained obscure).6 Instead of an additive approach, Loebbecke et al. 
15 
16 (1989, pp. 4–5) suggest a multiplicative one. For them, (i) opportunity, as “the degree to which 
17 conditions are such that a material management fraud could be committed” multiplied by (ii) 
18 
19 motivation  multiplied  by  (iii)  offenders‟  “attitude  or  set  of  ethical  values”  generate  deviant 
20 behaviour. Today, their approach is still a dominant one, however questionable the conceptual 
22 and empirical basis for it may be.7 
23 
24 Opportunity as a first FT element enables white-collar crime for a trust violator (Riemer, 1941). 
25 The crucial point to appreciate, however, is that few such opportunities will be exploited, for 
26 
27 opportunity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for fraud. Irrespective of how strong the 
28 manager‟s  motivation  may  be  (Coleman,  1987),  fraudulent  acts  are  not  possible  without 
30 opportunity and the recognition that there is one to make money or avoid loss; otherwise, even 
31 
32 the  existence  of  an  objective  opportunity  would  be  irrelevant.  Coleman  characterises  this 
33 necessary  element  as  attractive  or  unattractive  from  an  offender‟s  perspective  through  the 
34 
35 expectation of future benefits, potential risks and other opportunities. According to him, the 
36 attractiveness of an illegitimate opportunity (however  rationalised by the  individuals)  usually 
38 increases  as  the  availability  and  attractiveness  of  a  legal  opportunity  decreases.  Different 
39 
40 circumstances could encourage crime. These include an unstable or too complex organisational 
41 structure, inappropriate “tone at the top”, a shortage of staff, lack of audit trail and responsible 
42 
43 corporate governance, too little awareness or sensibility training, missing know-how, negligence 
44 or failure to discipline fraud perpetrators (AICPA, 2005; Dellaportas, 2012; Gobert & Punch, 2003; 
46 Hogan  et  al.,  2008;  Ramamoorti,  2008;  Rezaee,  2005).  If  the  organisational  compensation 
47 
48 system rewards individuals exclusively on the basis of performance with little or no regard for 
49 legal compliance and methods used to achieve their goals, the attractiveness and consequently 
50 
51 the feasibility of delinquent behaviour may increase (Herbert et al., 1998).8 Moreover, it seems 
52 
53 
54 
55 
6 They do not show how it is possible to scale or calculate these three elements. For instance, someone 
56 asserts: opportunity = “3“, motivation = “5“ and rationalisation = “2“; total = “3+5+2 = 10.” But it is quite obscure
 
57 how we can standardise the basis for these ratings and make them therefore evidence based. 
58 
7 For instance, someone asserts: opportunity = “3”, motivation = “5” and rationalisation = “0”; total = “3*5*0 = 0”; 
59 8 
60 
61 
hence, in absence of one element “zero fraud” is implied. 
In our view, the impact of this sort of compensation system on the risks respectively of crimes against the 
organisation and of crimes on behalf of its formal goals need to be analysed separately. Though in the light of 
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attractive for an offender to commit fraud and stay hidden within an organisation consisting of 
1 inexperienced or inattentive individuals. A routinized tick box control system in an organisation 
2 
3 may be regarded as offering poor controls and consequently additional opportunities for potential 
4 fraudsters, ultimately considered as a provocation or even as a positive invitation (Bell & Carcello, 
6 2000; Fink et al., 2008; Loebbecke et al., 1989; Lou & Wang, 2009; Murdock, 2008; Norman, 
7 
8 2010; Wells, 2001). It should be emphasised that many frauds develop over time from small 
9 beginnings that – when not reacted to – may escalate, so control weaknesses enable both “one- 
10 
11 off frauds” and a series of frauds, contributing greatly to total losses. 
12 Clinard and Quinney imply that corporate crime is a fraudulent act of the organisation itself or 
14 rather, is committed by internal staff of varying seniority on behalf of the corporation (1973; 
15 
16 Braithwaite, 1985); while offenders who commit occupational crimes are enriching themselves 
17 personally and harming employers in the course of their occupation (ACFE, 2014; Albrecht & 
18 
19 Albrecht, 2004; Schrager & Short, 1978). Goldstraw-White describes corporate and occupational 
20 crimes as “confused and blurred” (2012, p. 3) but does not go into greater detail. In the end, it 
22 remains variable how far fraudsters who deceive on behalf of their organisation or unit within it 
23 
24 may also benefit personally from their criminal acts (Shover & Hochstetler, 2006), for example via 
25 performance bonuses and promotion/not becoming redundant. This distinction addresses the 
26 
27 question as to what goals the offenders are pursuing and categorises them into personal and 
28 organisational  intentions,  though  an  organisation  always  acts  through  one  or  more  of  its 
30 individuals; but it does not explain incentive as a motivational element. However, the second FT 
31 
32 element, motivation, is an individual one and reflects the personal aims of an offender, though 
33 these may be mediated by social pressures to conform to peer group social values such as 
34 
35 providing “well” for your family, having the “right kind” of cars and holidays, and other aspects of 
36 the infinite anomie of the rich. Reducing all incentives to a common denominator appears to be a 
38 mistake as there are many different forms, e.g. the need for operational financing caused by poor 
39 
40 business results, an extravagant lifestyle, a search for status and expensive extramarital affairs, 
41 divorces or addictions (Efendi et al., 2007; Fink et al., 2008; Hogan et al., 2008; Lou & Wang, 
42 
43 2009; Murdock, 2008; Rezaee, 2005). There are additional non-monetary motivations, too, e.g. 
44 Spencer (1959) describes an approach with individuals tending to risky actions because of their 
46 so-called  “gambling   instinct”,  which   can   be   influenced   positively  or   negatively  by   the 
47 
48 organisational culture (Wheeler, 1992), including a high concentration of testosterone (Coates, 
49 2012). Frequently, fraudsters are driven more by the fear of losing everything they have achieved 
50 
51 in their life, e.g. prestige or money – so-called “fear of falling” – than by the incentive to gain more 
52 (Heath, 2008; Levi, 2010b; Piquero, 2012; Wheeler, 1992); (though in both cases, they have 
54 more funds than they would otherwise have). Meeting analysts‟ forecasts, poor personal or 
55 
56 organisational credit standing, unmanageable debts, and unexpected large contingencies such 
57 
58    
59 
60 
recent huge fines against financial institutions in many countries, the latter may receive a higher control 
61 
priority than in the past. 
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as medical bills – especially crucial where decent medical care is privatised – can provoke 
1 pressure (Crutchley et al., 2007; Hogan et al., 2008; Murdock, 2008). Like incentives, pressure is 
2 
3 not necessarily monetary: it can include items such as divorce, illness or difficulties with children 
4 as well as various other private problems (Dorminey et al., 2010). Not everyone will behave 
6 illegally in high-pressure situations. Private or occupational difficulties, which may lead people to 
7 
8 feel that they need to take money in an unauthorised way to meet all expectations, are frequently 
9 cited as “non-shareable problems” (Cressey, 1950; Cressey, 1953). Consistent with previous 
10 
11 findings, Lou and Wang (2009) affirm a positive correlation between sustained financial pressure 
12 from an organisation or supervisors and fraudulent statement reporting. 
14 Neutralising discrepancies between the moral beliefs of actors and the criminal act indicate the 
15 
16 third FT element to be in essence a psychological rationalisation process using socially available 
17 motives. The perpetrators try to find or unselfconsciously find an acceptable motive for their 
18 
19 actions while maintaining the positive self-image, as far as possible avoiding a guilty conscience. 
20 Cressey highlights that “they merely „kidded themselves‟ into thinking that it was not illegal” 
22 (1950, p. 743). In addition, to make misconduct plausible, it seems relevant to show the criminal 
23 
24 acts in case of detection intelligible to the social environment (Cressey, 1953). Hence, offenders 
25 try to rationalise their delinquent behaviour, by trying to make it more acceptable in the eyes of 
26 
27 the social group to which they belong and to minimise the negative emotions of others, e.g. 
28 shame, as well as perceived harmfulness and wrongfulness, if they are detected (Benson, 1985; 
30 Goldstraw-White, 2012; Levi, 2002; Murphy, 2012)9. As Albrecht and Albrecht note, “nearly every 
31 
32 fraud involves rationalization” (2004, p. 40) because the fraudsters “know what morality and the 
33 law require of them” (Heath, 2008, p. 611). When offenders violate strong social norms, so-called 
34 
35 accounts or socially approved vocabularies are of great importance (Mills, 1940) to neutralise 
36 morally (and in some cases legally) fraudulent acts if the conduct is called into question (Scott & 
38 Lyman, 1968). All attempts to rationalise their behaviour could be generally brought into manifold 
39 
40 excuses, e.g. “everybody else does it”, “nobody will get hurt”, “the company can afford it” etc. 
41 (Dellaportas, 2012; Klenowski et al., 2010; Levi, 2008; Murphy, 2012; Spencer, 1959; Stadler & 
42 
43 Benson, 2012; Sykes & Matza, 1957). Murphy (2012) examines rationalisation and attitudes in an 
44 experiment with accounting students, who were provided with the FT elements of opportunity and 
46 motivation.  She  reveals  that  participants  who  report  that  they  would  commit  fraud  use 
47 
48 rationalisation easily after their delinquent behaviour, even if the offenders had no need to explain 
49 themselves to external audiences, e.g. without penalties. In addition, she found that individuals 
50 
51 with an “attitude favouring misreporting, or higher Machiavellians” (p. 254) are more likely to 
52 commit  large  trust  violation.  Murphy‟s  results  illustrate  that  fraudsters  with  Machiavellian 
54 characteristics carry a smaller emotional burden from their misreporting. According to Willott et al. 
55 
56 (2001) some offenders go so far as to regard themselves as a kind of situational victim without 
57 
58    
59 9 A sociobiologist might argue that such blame and harm mitigation would also reduce the risk of formal action, 
60 
and therefore is more than psychologically functional. 
61 
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control over what they did or, one might consider in the passive voice, over “what happened”, 
1 which  lacks  culpable  agency.  They  can  even  consider  their  fraudulent  behaviour  as  an 
2 
3 unavoidable part of current business practices – apparently to the credo: “business is business” 
4 (Cressey, 1954; Galbraith, 2004). 
6 
7 
8 3. Methods 
9 
10 
11 
12 White-collar criminals themselves are a good if methodologically perilous source of insight into 
13 explaining financial trust violations. Even though there is an increasing focus in recent research 
14 
15 on implementing criminal managers‟ perspectives, interviews with fraudsters remain rare in the 
16 world  of  white-collar  crime.  The  present  article  involves  an  empirical  study  focusing  on 
17 
18 perpetrators who have been convicted because of financial statement fraud, corruption, bribery, 
19 
20 embezzlement, and accounting fraud in their organisations. The examination was conducted in 
21 the year 2010 when 1310 of German-speaking Switzerland (nine) and Western Austria‟s (four) 
22 
23 convicted offenders were interviewed face-to-face (twelve) or by telephone (one) in German with 
24 a total time duration of 1060 minutes.11 The investigation and conviction covers the period from 
25 
26 1990 to 2010; most of the convictions took place in the new millennium. 
27 
28 Sutherland (1940) wrote that crime can take place in elite groups, and introduces fraud by 
29 these “upper socio-economic classes” into criminological theory. For us, social status is not the 
30 
31 key point. Our theoretical position is similar to that of Edelhertz (1970) or Shapiro (1990, p. 363): 
32 “looking beyond the perpetrators‟ wardrobe and social characteristics and exploring the modus 
33 
34 operandi”: in other words, as with crime scripts, we are addressing „how‟ rather than primarily 
35 
36 „why‟ questions. Status can be an enabler of crime, inasmuch as it gives people the authority and 
37 indeed power to give instructions that normally will be obeyed, and creates status barriers to 
38 
39 intervention  even  by  auditors,  regulators  and  police.  With  high  professional  standing  and 
40 respectability – former and still active managing directors, partners, owners or CEOs of large 
41 
42 firms as well as other senior executives or accountants at highest management levels, politicians, 
43 
44 and supervisory board members –, our respondents correspond to the traditional white-collar 
45 criminal stereotype 12 : middle-aged white male, wealthy, well educated, no previous criminal 
46 
47 record, and a stable employment in a white-collar position (ACFE, 2009; Croall, 2001; Weisburd 
48 et al., 1991). This is why we call our fraudsters “high profile”13 or “elite” (Stephens, 2007); and 
49 
50 their victims also were usually large and famous organisations for which they have worked. 
51 
52 (Indeed a few fraudsters are still working for their organisation, which had previously been their 
53 
54 
55 
10    Some data were repeated during the last couple of interviews without additional information. Due to this 
56 circumstance, in our view, 13 interviews are enough to make some conceptual points. One interview was not
 
57 analysed because of the low information content compared to other tape recordings. 
58 
11    The applied interviews are semi-structured, problem-centred and open-ended (Witzel, 2000). 
59 
12    A stringent obligation to observe confidentiality, as well as the empirical problem of drawing conclusions make 
60 13 
61 
us careful to avoid more background information about the interviewees. 
In our article, the high profile has no bearing on the offenders‟ personality profile. 
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victim).14 Moreover, their combined crimes caused a direct loss of several hundred million Swiss 
1 Francs or Euros.15 These interviewed individuals are notably able to use their capabilities as well 
2 
3 as their occupational positions and consequently opportunities to commit “upperworld” criminal 
4 offences (Croall, 2001). 
6 This work used a semi-structured guideline questionnaire. The applied method provides a 
7 
8 basis for gaining in-deep knowledge about the offenders‟ perspectives. We claim no universal 
9 validity for our findings, rather a heuristic for further exploration and an ability to falsify theories 
10 
11 that claim to be universalistic. In a wider context this more explorative procedure permits the 
12 development of relevant issues and structures given by the responding individuals. The empirical 
14 research area, examining high profile offenders, is very time-consuming and difficult to access, 
15 
16 not only because of the seriousness of this topic and the confined respondent group, but also 
17 because of strict data protection regulations. In order to gather information regarding accessing 
18 
19 target  groups,  the  following  were  contacted:  prosecution  offices,  commissions  of  enquiry, 
20 ministries of justice, solicitor‟s offices, courts of law, consulting and auditing firms as well as the 
22 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners  (ACFE). Some  of  these  institutions  contacted  the 
23 
24 convicted persons and shared the contact data for scientific purposes only on a proper legal 
25 basis.  Others  established  contact  by  communicating  the  university  address  and  telephone 
26 
27 number to the fraudsters and asking them whether they were interested in participating in our 
28 study. In addition, a few respondents were traced through a court records analysis by the senior 
30 author of this article. Subsequently, an initial contact via telephone or email served as a basis to 
31 
32 individually agree further actions in accordance with our fraudsters‟ wishes, e.g. sending the 
33 interviewees additional information about the research or an assurance of anonymity before the 
34 
35 meeting took place. 
36 Whilst finding convicted individuals who voluntarily participated in the research, the interviewer 
38 (and first author) conducted some pre-tests to minimise the risk of mistakes as well as to avoid 
39 
40 misunderstandings  between  the  interviewees  and  the  interviewer,  e.g.  regarding  verbal 
41 formulations of the questions. For this self-training, non-criminal study volunteers put themselves 
42 
43 in the role of white-collar offenders, who subsequently were interviewed by the senior author of 
44 this work in a simulated situation. This procedure helps to remove ambiguities regarding the 
46 formulation of questions, and also benefits the interviewer with his behaviour and appearance. 
47 
48 Whereas Cressey and other researchers examined white-collar criminals in prison (e.g. Benson, 
49 
50    
51 14    In the majority of our examined cases, an accurate separation of occupational from corporate crime is not 
52 possible. Generally, the majority of the interviewees offended simultaneously both for themselves and for the 
53 organisation. Those cases where our convicted persons are still (or again) holding their position in the 
54 victimised  organisation  may be  explained  by  two  facts: First,  some  frauds are  not only  committed  „for 
55 themselves‟ but also „for the company‟. Second, a senior position in a company is sometimes difficult to 
56 replace immediately and the person was considered to be still valuable overall.
 
57 15    Swiss and Austrian courts as well as law firms selected the offenders according to the kind of fraudulent 
58 behaviour and to the damage quantified in Swiss Francs or Euro as high as possible. A stringent obligation to 
59 observe confidentiality, as well as the empirical problem of drawing conclusions make us careful to avoid an 
60 average or median figure of the damage caused. Moreover, losses to victims may not correspond to profit to 
61 offenders, and may be difficult to calculate accurately (Levi & Burrows, 2008). 
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1984; Klenowski et al., 2010; Spencer, 1959; Willott et al., 2001; and others), all our interviews 
1 were carried out with 13 fraudsters who already had been released or who never did any jail time, 
2 
3 though all eleven male and two female offenders were convicted by a Swiss or Austrian court. 
4 However, our results have to be handled with some caution. First, our empirical contribution is 
6 limited to detected high-profile offenders in Switzerland and Austria. Second, the explanations of 
7 
8 offending  are  based  on  an  analysis  of  ex-post  verbalisation  (possibly  suitably  modified  for 
9 audiences even in private) and “may involve appeal to a vocabulary of motives” (Mills, 1940, p. 
10 
11 907), which could be pre-formed for a specific group. And finally, even though we do not intend to 
12 test the FT (except inasmuch as we are testing its universal applicability), our sample size is too 
14 small  to  formulate  a  defensible  universally  applicable  hypothesis.  External  white-collar  (or 
15 
16 “organised”) criminals operating non-collusively outside an organisation (e.g. tax or credit card 
17 fraudsters, clandestine workers etc.) or undiscovered perpetrators are not considered at all. 
18 
19 Given the role that Austrian and Swiss banks and other professionals have played as facilitators 
20 of money laundering and tax evasion, this is a limitation. 
22 We were aware of the risk that interviewees could enact a kind of performance for us rather 
23 
24 than  revealing  their  thoughts  to  strangers.  Though  this  risk  cannot  be  entirely  excluded, 
25 measures  were  taken  to  keep  this  to  a  minimum,  via  a  private  and  tension-free  interview 
26 
27 environment. No model can eliminate respondent bias from retrospection and concern about how 
28 direct observers will view the morality of their conduct (Levi, 2008). All fraudsters volunteered to 
30 participate in one to one conversations at a time and place of their choice, usually in the 
31 
32 afternoon at a café. There was no surveillance from prison officers behind closed doors, which 
33 may distort the collected data material. The respondents were informed comprehensively in 
34 
35 advance about the purpose, scope and aims of the inquiry as well as anything else requested. 
36 Before the interview, the perpetrators received a signed university letter, which have assurances 
38 of  anonymity.  Furthermore,  some  small  talk  increased  rapport  and  made  the  atmosphere 
39 
40 comfortable for this sensitive issue. The interviewee was told that s/he could feel free to skip 
41 particularly distressing questions but none did so; everyone voluntarily answered all questions. 
42 
43 The questionnaire includes recurring but reformulated questions to support the verification of 
44 whether an answer was evasive or deceitful. In total, systematic errors or inconsistencies in the 
46 transcribed interviews are very rare. Considering the careful planning and preparation as well as 
47 
48 the serious attitude of our respondents, we assume a negligible effect on the answers. 
49 All interviews were recorded on tape followed by transcriptions, which were compiled verbatim 
50 
51 after having obtained an agreement of the respondents. The fundamental objective was to make 
52 sense of unordered data collected by examining it from various angles. Strictly guided by rules, 
54 the data obtained were systematically analysed via several codification processes compliant with 
55 
56 all requirements of the computer-aided content analysis named GABEK®/WinRelan® (Zelger & 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
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Oberprantacher, 2002).16 Although our dataset is small, we consider it appropriate to use an 
1 elaborate computer-based analysis to accommodate the complexity of the collected manifest 
2 
3 content (what definitely has been said) and, hence, to allow detailed inferences to be drawn 
4 about offenders‟ perspectives on the elements of the FT. The codification is built up from four 
6 sequential working steps recommended by Zelger and Oberprantacher (2002). The analysing 
7 
8 procedure  occurs  without  any  coder‟s  influence  on  the  findings  and  without  any  room  for 
9 assumptions. Even if it is impossible to deny the crucial role played by our own subjectivity and 
10 
11 intuition in the final process of data interpretation, all previous content analysis results are solely 
12 based on a respondent‟s perspective.  The codification process in a first phase of  analysis 
14 consists  of  an  identification  of  content-relevant  lexical  terms  (nouns,  adjectives,  verbs  and 
15 
16 compound terms). Apart from this basic analysis, a second working step occurred in which 
17 explicitly mentioned positive and negative evaluations of terms were identified. This is based on 
18 
19 how respondents evaluate terms, e.g. negative evaluation of pressure: “…the terrible pressure 
20 
21 …” (WCC 10, 2010); positive evaluation of internal control system: “…a perfect internal 
22 control system …” (WCC 5, 2010). An evaluation always has to be “obvious”, or coding is 
23 
24 forbidden.  Then,  they  were  separated  into  an  actual  (expressed  real  phenomena  and  its 
25 
26 evaluation), e.g. “… the internal control system is poor …” (WCC 3, 2010); and a desired 
27 (expressed hypothetical phenomena and its evaluation) condition, e.g. “…an effective internal 
28 
29 control  system  would  solve  many  problems  …” (WCC  8,  2010).  In  a  third  review  of  the 
30 
31 transcripts, the causal connections expressed by the fraudsters are coded, e.g. “… the more 
32 greed  the  more  incentive  …”  (WCC  4,  2010).  Beyond  that,  fraud-favourable  and  fraud- 
34 unfavourable influences from an offender‟s view were identified and coded, e.g. “… the better 
35 
36 the controls the less fraud …” (WCC 8, 2010). After the three steps, a fourth and last procedure 
37 according to several rules (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic) occurred and finally re-presents 
39 the data into a hierarchically ordered structure to get from pieces of text units through rule-based 
40 
41 information  compressing to  an  overall  summarised  view. If  a  coded  term  “variable A”, e.g. 
42 “pressure”, reaches a higher level in the hierarchical structure than “variable B”, e.g. “incentive”, if 
43 
44 “variable A” is evaluated more often than “variable B” and if “variable A” is embedded in more 
45 causal relations than “variable B”, then “variable A” is considered as more relevant than “variable 
47 B.” In general, different individuals are able to code the same text in the same manner to assure 
48 
49 validity, reliability and consistency. All stringent coding and analysing processes are systematic 
50 and create a precondition for transparency, reconstruction and intersubjective comprehensibility 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
16    The applied method, devised by Professor Zelger, was developed for scientific purposes.
 
57 GABEK®/WinRelan® was selected as one of the finalists of the European Academic Software Awards (EASA) 
58 and still is used at several major universities, e.g. Stanford University. Albeit other programs may used more 
59 widely, the software choice depended on our purpose and target of the content analysis: achieving a better 
60 understanding in terms of cause-effect relationship of the transcribed interviews. In total, 425 content-relevant 
61 terms and 10.505 connections between them were identified and coded. 
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(Zelger & Oberprantacher, 2002). Ultimately, the content analysis systematises the distributed 
1 knowledge and, thus, promotes a holistic view of the records. 
2 
3 
4 4. Results 
6 
7 
8 Some conclusions deviate from the general analysis in recent scientific papers. Overall, it is 
9 
10 astonishing that the constellation of the FT elements is found in the same manner from the 
11 
12 perspective of our interviewed white-collar offenders. According to them, pressure, opportunity 
13 and incentive are relevant “triggers”. A substantial difference between the literature findings and 
14 
15 this empirical study is that some of our high profile fraud perpetrators consider that not all 
16 elements of the triangle are mandatory for committing “upperworld” white-collar crime. When 
17 
18 fraudsters never intended to commit fraud at any stage and honestly believe that their behaviour 
19 is  not  criminal  (Cressey,  1953), 17  opportunity  alone  is  obligatory  for  fraudulent  behaviour. 
21 According to these respondents, there is no pressure, no incentive and no rationalisation at all. 
22 
23 Several interviewed convicts from different employment settings never intend to commit fraud at 
24 any stage, having realised too late that they were breaking the law or still maintaining that their 
25 
26 activities were not wrong at all: “We did not have unlawfulness in our mind. …What we did 
27 
28 caused none of us to have a bad conscience” (WCC 3, 2010). “There was no inducement at all. 
29 We never decided to deceive the people. The intention never existed. … The incentive to 
30 
31 defraud was not given, there was none … No, the inner voice may be the case for others” 
32 
33 (WCC 10, 2010). “No, there was no pressure and, no inner voice because I was not aware of my 
34 wrongdoing at this time” (WCC 4, 2010). A multiplication of one of the FT elements by zero 
35 
36 remains  zero  fraud.  In  the  light  of  our  findings,  we  have  to  reject  the  abovementioned 
37 multiplicative combination of the FT elements. In essence, they pretend neither to face any 
39 motivation nor rationalisation. This type of offender who sees nothing wrong in their behaviour 
40 
41 patterns can be allocated to the category type (1) “slippery-slope fraudsters” (Levi, 2008, pp. 
42 252–254).18 Levi describes this type of slippery-sloper as individuals who “do not see what they 
43 
44 are doing as rule-breaking in any sense at all, and consequently do not need to „normalize‟ it by 
45 reference to some technique of neutralization or special motivational account” with regard to their 
47 “unconscious repression mechanism” to solve the problem “by blotting out their awareness” 
48 
49 (2008, p. 89 and p. 254). Hence, the absence of “specific” motivation and rationalisation is not 
50 completely surprising. Beyond that, some of our high profile perpetrators might be akin to the so- 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
17    Cressey describes this innocent kind of fraudster as „independent businessmen” (Cressey, 1953, p. 102). 
56 
18    Levi  categorises  long-firm  (bankruptcy)  fraud  thus:  “running  one  or  more  businesses  with  the  initial  or 
57 subsequent aim of defrauding creditors” (2008, p. xvii), and other fraud into a threefold typology: “(1) pre- 
58 planned frauds, in which the business scheme is set up from the start as a way of defrauding victims …(2) 
59 intermediate frauds, in which people started out obeying the law but consciously turned to fraud later and (3) 
60 slippery-slope frauds, often in the context of trying … to rescue an essentially insolvent business or set of 
61 businesses” (2008, p. xix). 
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called “predators”19 because motivation as well as rationalisation have no or little relevance for 
1 them. 
2 
3 From the offenders‟ perspective, “opportunity can make the thief” and leaks in organisations, 
4 e.g. absence of transparency as well as lack of control through weak compliance, auditing or 
6 management accounting, are seldom entirely closed down in their former organisations; this 
7 
8 circumstance offers an attractive feasibility for fraud. “The weaknesses still exist. There is no real 
9 control mechanism. There is just too little control …if that can even be called a control.” (WCC 
10 
11 8, 2010). An interviewed fraudster states that “the controls do not work. You can report a faked 
12 
13 up story …the opportunity was given, I did not want to do it but I had to do it …the 
14 organisation is a nice one but there are leaks everywhere” (WCC 2, 2010). At this point the 
15 
16 interviewee support the often referred findings from Gobert and Punch (2007), who argue that an 
17 organisation  can  serve  as  an  instrument to  achieve  goals, perform  power  and  provide  the 
19 motivation as well as the opportunity to a certain extent. The trust violators interviewed take 
20 
21 advantage of organisational deficiencies, and, according to them, are easily able to commit fraud 
22 by their expert knowledge or special capability and by the incompetence of persons in their 
23 
24 professional environment. Some offenders talked about the detailed knowledge to commit an 
25 upperworld offence as well as the importance of the hierarchical position of one‟s occupation: 
27 “My key position in the organisationstimulated and cleared the way for the fraud. I built up the 
28 
29 internal controls with some colleagues and I was the only person in the whole organisation, who 
30 understood exactly how it works” (WCC 11, 2010). Generally, individuals who develop or work 
31 
32 with internal control systems know best how to manipulate them; but that does not mean that they 
33 
34 have any intention at all to do so, or presumably the fraud rate would be a great deal higher than 
35 it plausibly is, even taking into account the dark figure of undetected frauds. The abuse of power 
36 
37 and trust given to managers, and the fact that these persons are able to de-activate security 
38 measures, is often described as “management override”. Organisational weak points will be 
39 
40 exploited mercilessly. Subsequently, in case of a deliberate act, most of them have “heartbeats, 
41 
42 strong, if the external audit firm is checking in the organisation and then it continues in the same 
43 fashion as before if not get caught, that is a fact … sometimes the auditors have too much 
44 
45 trust in the wrong place” (WCC 11, 2010). Further, several respondents stress that decisions in 
46 key positions (key means access to cash flows) with full authority of one person or staff shortage 
48 – especially in cases with a lack of time – may constitute an alluring occasion. Even though the 
49 
50 respondents do not describe opportunity as a classical motivational trigger, this element has to 
51 exist for them, as previously mentioned. It is regarded as the only necessary condition of all 
52 
53 elements. Hence, we reject the previously cited unconstrained additive combination. 
54 
55 
56 
19    The literature distinguishes between two forms of trust violators: “accidental fraudster” and “predator”. The
 
57 former,  a  law-abiding  person,  is  often  characterised  as  the  typical  white-collar  criminal.  The  latter,  an 
58 individual who might have begun as an “accidental fraudster” turn into a “predator” and, hence, is better 
59 organised, has more complex concealment schemes, and is better prepared to handle monitoring, control 
60 systems and auditors than the typical fraudster. A “predator” only needs opportunity to commit a financial 
61 crime (Dorminey et al., 2012; Rezaee & Riley, 2010). 
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However, the results also conclude that the perceived pressure is salient to most white-collar 
1 criminal  offences.  As  documented  through  the  content  analysis,  this  element  is  the  most 
2 
3 commonly correlated with committing fraud and is identified as the most often directly linked 
4 element to triggering fraud, though not a necessary condition for fraud. Moreover, this most 
6 responsibly made trigger for fraud is also the most often negatively evaluated element by the 
7 
8 respondents found in all our empirical data by far. “In the organisation a lot of pressure was 
9 applied and I have been rudely insulted. That was the beginning of my problem” (WCC 2, 2010). 
10 
11 “The most likely important trigger was the pressure” (WCC 1, 2010). “Maybe it would have been 
12 
13 possible to handle the pressure in another way and try to find other solutions” (WCC 6, 2010). 
14 This statement shows that from an offender‟s perspective, a fraudulent act seems to be a 
15 
16 plausible possibility to  escape  the  before  mentioned  non-shareable  problem.  Generally, our 
17 pressure-findings can be divided into the two following subgroups: 
18 
19 Pressure caused by external influences. “My behaviour was only caused by the pressure 
20 
21 situation because the unpleasant working atmosphere was very vicious and this was the trigger, 
22 which finally results in fraud” (WCC 1, 2010). Next to an inadequate and atrocious organisational 
23 
24 culture, financial aspects also can put this kind of exertion on managers. An interviewed person 
25 explicitly mentioned that pre-set goals are mainly responsible: “I never put myself under pressure. 
26 
27 To fulfil external requirements, not private …but financial, caused pressure” (WCC 12, 2010). In 
28 
29 addition, we found that different profiteers (e.g. a person suffering from illness or a briber in a 
30 network of intrigues) may have decisive influences, too. Pressure is perceived as similar to the 
31 
32 impact of external influences but exists predominantly in an offender‟s mind. In this case the 
33 fraudster may be afraid of appearing as an underdog. “You are thinking that people are saying 
35 bad things about you …in retrospect I really do not know if this was indeed the case or just my 
36 
37 own imagination” (WCC 6, 2010). The pressure to fulfil self-generated „requirements‟, which are 
38 as high as possible by the effort to escape through creating a “homemade mission impossible.” 
39 
40 Afterwards  it  has  become  apparent  that  this  is  a  dead-end  street:  “The  pressure  was 
41 
42 psychological …so I had no more power left to withstand the situation. I thought I could fix 
43 everything with the figures. I set myself very high goals. My employees told me that it would be 
44 
45 impossible to achieve this goal. I tried to achieve this anyhow” (WCC 2, 2010). 
46 Yet,  fraudulent  behaviour  caused  by  pressure  can  create  additional  pressure.  Several 
48 offenders try to correct their criminal act after the fraud has been carried out. In their perception, 
49 
50 “there is hope to straighten the old or previous offence out through another additional offence. 
51 Worrying about being discovered” (WCC 6, 2010). “I wanted to redress this whole situation again. 
52 
53 That has been an enormous pressure” (WCC 2, 2010). Some of the interviewed perpetrators 
54
 20 
55 
describe it as like some kind of a “pressure pull” 
56 
 
 
57 20 
, which makes an individual liberation seldom 
58 Nieuwenboer and Kaptein (2008) focus on the spiralling nature of white-collar crime. From a theoretical 
59 perspective but without any empirical studies they address the spread and growth of corruption in companies 
60 and, drawing on social identity theory, identify three organisational spirals: The spiral of divergent norms, of 
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possible. Nevertheless, our respondents would not accept any help from an anonymous, trustful 
1 and  neutral  institution  at  the  time  of  their  offences  because  of   suspiciousness,  self- 
2 
3 aggrandisement  and  overestimation  of  their  own  capabilities,  as  they  admit.  Therefore,  an 
4 ombudsman‟s office, an internal corporate helpline or an external point of contact are considered 
6 as not professionally competent enough. The fraudsters seriously believe that their matters would 
7 
8 not be legally enforceable by such an internal or external contact institution. For them, the non- 
9 shareable problem causes pressure and remains non-shareable. 
10 
11 Overall, cyclical interrelations can be  seen in our empirical data, showing pressure in a 
12 repetitive  and  self-reinforcing  process.  This  finding  again  highlights  the  importance  of  this 
14 motivational element. From the interruption or modification of the pressure element, within the 
15 
16 cyclical interrelations primarily caused by bullying at work, strained relationships or overly high 
17 achievement goals, conflicts and negative organisational culture, the adversely amplifying effect 
18 
19 could be abrogated or even discontinued. This has implications for our understanding of the 
20 triggers of fraudulent behaviour and their prevention. Instead of pressure reduction, our convicted 
22 individuals perceive that there are unchanged weaknesses in their actual organisations, whether 
23 
24 their former victims or other companies. According to the respondents, a reduction of pressure 
25 would have a highly positive effect, which would create a culture of trust and ultimately reduce 
26 
27 such crimes. The question arises of whether a reduction or even elimination of this FT element 
28 may create  a  complacent work  environment where  goals  are  achieved  less  frequently  and 
30 generate net losses in organisational profitability. Apart from the fact that this would exceed the 
31 
32 scope of our article, we assume that there is no universal answer, rather an individual one to find 
33 an adequate balance tailored to an organisation, a position and even to a person. 
34 
35 A few fraudsters regard their fraudulent behaviour as an incitement to repay private debts or 
36 liabilities.  In  particularly important to  white-collar criminals  with high  social  and  professional 
38 standing, status can create pressure, too. “My incentive was not to appear as a loser” (WCC 6, 
39 
40 2010). With this argument, the boundaries between the elements of incentive and pressure melt 
41 into their common root: “motivation” because the respondent is afraid of appearing as a loser and 
42 
43 this fact could cause pressure, too. The empirical study makes plain that incentives can be 
44 perceived in many different ways. Some offenders compare it with sailing in choppy waters, 
46 which makes an individual exemption, similar and as problematic as pressure, hardly possible. 
47 
48 According to them, incentives are not mainly responsible for fraudulent behaviour but relevant. 
49 Most of our respondents enriched themselves personally and tried to harm the organisation with 
50 
51 or without intention to offend. Our participants explicitly mention their motivation, which can be 
52 partly driven by selfish greed: “It is driven by greed. The incentive was tangible in my case, so 
54 materialistic.  I  lost  ground;  many  of  us  feel  the  same.  Then  you  will  overcome  your  own 
55 
56 limitations.  You  want  a  higher  and  higher  wage”  (WCC  4,  2010).  “My incentive  was  early 
57 retirement” (WCC 7, 2010). “The opportunity was an incentive. …Incentive …to live over the 
58 
59 usually possible standard of living in my situation. …Then it became a sporting event. … It 
60 
61 was a challenge in this sense. … Breaking out of this situation is difficult” (WCC 11, 2010). 
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Nevertheless, some of the  upperworld crimes committed in the course of  our respondents‟ 
1 occupation  are  a  mixture  between  occupational  (managerial  or  individual)  and  corporate 
2 
3 (organisational) crimes. For some fraudsters the criminal incident leads to a higher added value 
4 for the organisation as well as for themselves: “You have to exhaust the legal boundaries up to a 
6 maximum and think about new possibilities to do something for the organisation. This incentive is 
7 
8 worth more …to realise your project” (WCC 9, 2010). The triangle element incentive seems to 
9 serve as a desirable force to act as economically as possible or as an instrument to get the 
10 
11 desired doses of adrenalin through risk taking activities. Such a type of propulsion can derail if it 
12 
13 is exploited too much. In this context, the fraudsters explain that occasionally there is a thin line 
14 between legal and illegal. 
15 
16 Cressey took the view that rationalisations “were always present before the criminal act took 
17 place” (1953, p. 94). Data acquisition in this area of research commonly takes place after the 
18 
19 perpetrator has committed a crime, so one might regard retrospective reflections  – even if 
20 
21 believed by offenders themselves – as being contaminated by post-event processes, rather than 
22 as a “black box” flight recorder. The analysis of our interviews suggests that some fraudsters 
23 
24 attempt to shirk responsibility, e.g. by arguing that controls were weak, pressure was tremendous 
25 etc., and may regard themselves as a victim of a perfect storm due to misfortune and setbacks 
26 
27 (Sykes & Matza, 1957) with an opportunity to relieve themselves and solve the non-shareable 
28 
29 problem. One might overstate and add that some individuals simply drifted into this situation 
30 without conscious decisions to break the law. Conversely, the argument of “weak controls” or 
31 
32 “high pressure” can be construed as part of a rationalisation. Thus, in our empirical data analysis 
33 this FT element can solely be detected by means of our own subjective interpretation because 
34 
35 the respondents do not excuse their offences or make them smaller than they actually are. If we 
36 
37 take our interviewees seriously and exactly at their word without “over-analysing” the statements, 
38 none of our fraudsters explicitly rationalise their fraudulent behaviour. Compared to other studies 
39 
40 with white-collar criminals the non-existence of rationalisation could relate to the fact that our 
41 respondents were not interviewed in prison and hence may feel less as a convict and more on a 
42 
43 par  with  the  interviewer,  not  in  an  unequal  footing,  which  could  initiate  or  contribute  to 
44 
45 rationalisation. However, we assume that the process of rationalisation is Cressey‟s subjective 
46 point of view, his personal interpretation; and as in our case, this may be mistaken. Instead of 
47 
48 rationalisation, a fraud-inhibiting inner voice and a guilty conscience are identified, which is not 
49 necessarily inconsistent with the FT but is a new twist on the “habitus” of how some fraudsters 
50 
51 come to do their work. According to the respondents, “the inner voice said: Do not do that, drop it, 
52 
53 do not make that” (WCC 6, 2010). “The appeal was greater than the inner voice” (WCC 11, 
54 2010). “I have repressed the inner voice” (WCC 9, 2010). “The inner voice persisted the first time. 
55 
56 After all my undetected transactions over a period of several years, I was able to sit back and 
57 relax. It is brutal. Put that in your pipe and smoke it” (WCC 12, 2010). Sutherland (1939) or 
58 
59 Gobert  and  Punch  (2007)  –  neither  of  which  studies  interviewed  fraudsters  –  impute  no 
60 
61 experience of any guilt and no remorse to the offenders, whereby they relativise their argument 
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with the addition that it is difficult to comprehend what is exactly happening in a fraudster‟s mind 
1 while committing fraud. By contrast, we note that they still have a bad conscience; even years 
2 
3 after their frauds. The interviewees do not find themselves to be above the law. According to 
4 them, the fraud-inhibiting inner voice before they commit a delinquent act becomes quieter over 
6 time. We document that in our cases, the inner voice, which deters an individual from fraud, is 
7 
8 mainly affected by the organisational culture. "This inner voice was governed by hassle and 
9 trench warfare from all directions within the organisation" (WCC 1, 2010). In addition, the longer 
10 
11 the acts of the delinquents remain unnoticed, the less they have a guilty conscience. "After a 
12 
13 while the inner voice disappeared …then it the fraudbecame a day-to-day routine" (WCC 12, 
14 2010). 
15 
16 
17 5. Discussion 
19 
20 
21 Contrary  to  findings  in  the  literature  and  the  previously  mentioned  international  fraud 
22 
23 standards, we found that only opportunity is (perhaps tautologically) mandatory for committing a 
24 white-collar crime, according to our interviewed offenders. This relevant theoretical contribution 
26 has to be considered wherever the FT is used. Our respondents perceive the existence of the 
27 
28 necessary condition opportunity and the triggering element “high pressure” in an organisation as 
29 a  breeding  ground  for  fraudulent  behaviour.  The  clear  majority  of  our  detected  offenders 
30 
31 nominate pressure as the most relevant FT element mainly responsible for their crimes. Beyond 
32 that, the importance of pressure is affirmed by several findings from the literature. Thus, authors 
34 from different backgrounds all stress that high-pressure environments in organisations are a 
35 
36 particularly relevant fraud risk factor. Such an environment is not necessarily an indication of the 
37 presence of white-collar crime, but it serves as a “red flag” and special attention has to be paid in 
38 
39 these circumstances. It would not be surprising if delinquents in top-management positions put a 
40 high value on neutralisation of their acts because they are part of respected occupational classes, 
42 wherein the perception that they are dishonest can quickly destroy their private and professional 
43 
44 reputation, at least if it is marked by formal sanctions. Hence, it is intriguing that we identify a 
45 fraud-inhibiting inner voice before and a guilty conscience after the crime, instead of merely 
46 
47 rationalisation. This voice becomes quieter over time before the fraud occurs. Moreover, the 
48 longer the frauds remain hidden, the less the offenders have a guilty conscience after the crime. 
50 The implication of these continuously temporal changing components is a new finding. In general, 
51 
52 rationalisation has to be complemented by the inner voice (inhibiting or triggering) and the 
53 conscience  (clear  or  guilty).  It  must  be  recognized  that  the  elements  accompanying  and 
54 
55 influencing fraud modify over time – before and after the fraud – mainly affected by environmental 
56 conditions, e.g. the corporate culture.21 
58    
59 21    Banking scandals since the financial crisis of 2007-present have illustrated the importance of individual as well 
60 
as general corporate culture as enablers of white-collar crimes, though it remains to be seen whether those 
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Overall, serious studies that systematically examine the causes of fraudulent behaviour and 
1 use interviews with high profile white-collar criminals are rare. Thus, journal papers in this field 
2 
3 are limited. To enhance clarity regarding the causes of white-collar crime, in particular in the 
4 corporate context, is a problem for researchers, as noted by scientists from various fields (Gobert 
6 & Punch, 2007; and others). Cressey‟s nearly 60 year old vehicle, the FT, based on a sample of 
7 
8 embezzlers persists as a sacrosanct benchmark and from an accounting perspective, appears as 
9 a general theory of financial crime due to its dominant position in fraud standards. Granted, as is 
10 
11 usually the case with models, the FT does still offer an incomplete but useful abstraction of 
12 complex  interactions,  it  nevertheless  neglects  the  impact  of  social  systems  on  individual 
14 decisions to commit fraud. Greater importance arguably should be attached to a discipline of the 
15 
16 social  sciences,  where  fraud  has  a  long-established  place  in  research:  criminology.  New 
17 approaches allow alternative insights to post-fraud interventions, e. g. effective sanctioning of 
18 
19 perpetrators to avoid recidivism and increase general deterrence, and to fraud prevention, e. g. in 
20 terms of shaping internal and external corporate governance, and the legitimacy of controls. To 
22 enrich  the  fraud  accounting  research,  education  and  practice,  we  suggest  intensifying  the 
23 
24 dialogue with criminological research, including that which problematises the professional and 
25 social construction of fraud. Our study did not have the opportunity to examine how far the social 
26 
27 context exactly affects fraudulent behaviour in organisations; but a focus on individual decision- 
28 making denuded of the context in which offenders see Machiavellianism and narcissism as 
30 positive  traits  of  business  heroes  seems  misplaced.  Galbraith  observes  that  "legal  self- 
31 
32 enrichment in the millions of dollars is a common feature of modern corporate government" 
33 (2004, p. 27). Numerous examples in his book "The Economics of Innocent Fraud", based on the 
34 
35 assumption that there is a gap between the predominant opinion and the truth, illustrate the 
36 manner in which fraudulent practices become respectable, legitimate and even institutionalized. 
38 Moreover,  an  inclusion  of  psychological  aspects  may  expand  our  understanding  of  the 
39 
40 motivations  and  rationalizations  for  fraud.  Kohlberg's  approach  (1981)  is  based  upon  the 
41 assumption that moral development is essential for an individual's behaviour. Levels of moral 
42 
43 reasoning are developed in the same sequence, depending on several criteria such as the ability 
44 to project one's self into the other's perspective, though not everyone reach the highest moral 
46 reasoning. More norm-infringing forms of egregious fraud are more difficult to justify morally to all 
47 
48 but  the most  sociopathic,  hence,  independent  of  the  risks  of  intervention  by  organisational 
49 controls, less likely to happen. 
50 
51 Benson (1984) explored the effects of conviction on the occupational status of white-collar 
52 offenders with data drawn from the case histories of 70 white-collar offenders. His results are 
54 difficult to compare with ours because he did not examine the same kind of offenders as we did; 
55 
56 but important for this work is Benson‟s finding that the type of occupation is an important factor in 
57 
58    
59 
60 
currently not identified as “cultural problems” will turn out to have behaved significantly differently. Accounting 
61 
for inter-capitalist differences is inhibited by their lack of transparency. 
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white-collar criminals‟ loss of occupational status following conviction. Convicted fraudsters in this 
1 league seem to know they would destroy their reputation even more if they do not admit that their 
2 
3 crimes were their own errors of judgment. These individuals may seek to depict themselves as 
4 human beings with strengths and weaknesses; instead of disavowing their delinquency, they try 
6 to make it acceptable or at least much less unacceptable through showing regret and remorse. 
7 
8 They are convicted and the process has already damaged their prestige independent of how they 
9 are sentenced; “the process is the punishment”. As a next step, convicted white-collar offenders 
10 
11 are reflective enough to recognise that they have to rebuild their damaged reputation through 
12 exhibiting moral fibre and some degree of contrition. The difficulty for their audiences is to decide 
14 when to take these claims about change as genuine and when to view them as just a further 
15 
16 stage  in  their  Machiavellian  attempts  to  manipulate  their  environment.  If  we  adopt  the 
17 precautionary principle, we may never find out that they would not have reoffended; if we are 
18 
19 trusting, we sometimes may find that we have been conned again. 
20 
21 
22 Role of the funding source 
24 
25 
26 As usual, all matters of fact and interpretation remain the responsibility of the authors. In 2011 
27 
28 this research was funded through a one-year grant of the Swiss National Science Foundation 
29 (SNF), which did not influence the study design, collection, analysis or interpretation of data; nor 
30 
31 writing of the report or the decision to submit the paper for publication. In any event, they are an 
32 apolitical scientific body. 
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*Response to Reviewers 
 
 
 
 
Reviewers' comments and response: 
 
This paper seeks to explain motives for fraud from the perspective of the offenders. It 
tests the explanatory power of fraud triangle. Evidence is provided from 1060 minute 
interviews with 13 convicted offenders from Switzerland and Austria. I have a number 
of observations. 
 
1. It would be helpful to explain how the concept of "fraud" is deployed in the paper. 
Currently, it makes numerous mention of the word and does not explain the meaning(s) 
that the authors attach to the term. Without some conceptual clarity, it is difficult to take 
the reader with you. 
 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 1 (particularly relevant: Introduction): The content 
of rules, auditing standards and criminal laws is constantly changing over time and 
jurisdiction: thus, the framework within which the label of Ǯfraudǯ is attached is relative 
from a legal as well as from a social point of view (Sutherland, 1939). Attempts to generate – explicitly or implicitly – a universal definition and demarcation of "fraud" invariably 
generate boundary disputes. Under the interdisciplinary and multifaceted concept of 
fraud, we generally mean a criminal violation of financial trust (Cressey, 1950; Sutherland, 
1941). White-collar criminals, sometimes called "trust violators", commit fraud in a 
business environment, usually without any physical force, and confer an illegal economic 
advantage for themselves and/or for their organisation. According to our paper, the illicit 
behaviour of our convicted Swiss and Austrian fraudsters in the course of their 
occupational activities (or by abuse of their authority to dispose of corporate assets) 
causes serious tangible and intangible damage. Explanations for why some individuals do 
not follow certain rules under adverse conditions and others do still provoke debate in 
accounting, criminology and in other fields of research." 
 
2. The paper's theory of fraud is primarily an articulation of the fraud triangle and the 
fraud diamond rather than any general theory of fraud. It would be helpful to rationalize 
the approach of the paper and provide better connections with the empirical evidence. 
 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 2 (particularly relevant: Introduction): Several risk 
factors of different fraud standards are predicated on the FT. The fraud risk factorsǯ 
relevance is acknowledged by American standards, [see Auditing Standard (AS) No. 5 
(PCAOB, 2007) or Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 82 (AICPA, 1997)] as well as 
by other international auditing standards [Pruefungsstandard (PS) 210 (IDW, 2006), 
International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240 or ISA 250 (IFAC, 2013)]. The Statement  
on Auditing Standards, SAS 99 (AICPA, 2002), "categorizes these factors according to the 
fraud triangle" (Wilks & Zimbelman, 2004, p. 723; Donegan & Ganon, 2008; Norman, 
2010). 
 
The FT is a sub-set of the more generic Crime Triangle, and though it focuses us away from 
broader issues of the non-incrimination of privileged business elites (Barak, 2012; 
Friedrichs, 2009), it is commonly used in academic and professional circles as a heuristic 
framework for explaining fraud." 
 
3. The theory section of the paper individualizes the motivations for fraud though "social 
construction" is thrown in on page 15, but is not really used in the theory section of the 
paper. Of course, deviant behavior is always possible and all individuals eventually die, 
  
but social problems persist. This would suggest that fraud is embedded in social systems. 
We cannot understand what individuals do without the social context. Emile Durkheim's 
famous work on suicide makes the point that suicide is the most individual of human acts, 
but it is not the act of an isolated individual. Rather social values relating to notions of 
success, failure, happiness, fulfilment, etc. the context of the act. I would argue that the 
social context is equally relevant in explaining the persistence of fraud. 
For example, capital markets constantly expect companies to report higher profits. In 
western culture, an individual's worth is often assessed by accumulation of material 
wealth. Those accumulating vast amounts are lauded as stars, leaders and role models 
living glamorous lives, which others ought to emulate. Such cultural values incubate fraud 
and seem to be beyond the control of any single individual. This should encourage some 
reflections on the claim that "... Firefighters know that a fire can be extinguished by 
eliminating any one of the three elements" (pp. 20-21)." I can understand the analogy but 
the difficulty is that the origins of fire are not necessarily in the organization or the 
individual, but in society at large which is reproduced with the conscious thoughts of 
individuals (as critical realism suggests). May be an elaboration of "social construction" 
would be helpful. 
 
A related difficulty is that over a period, some practices become normalized but seen 
though the lens of history may appear to be illicit or predatory. Thus Galbraith raises the 
spectre of what he calls "innocent fraud", which draws attention to how some negative 
practices become respectable and even institutionalized (Galbraith, 2004). Thus notions 
of responsible governance, etc. may actually nurture fraudulent practices as evident from 
practices at Enron, WorldCom and more recently at many financially institutions. 
 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 3 (particularly relevant: Discussion): Our study did 
not have the opportunity to examine how far the social context exactly affects fraudulent 
behaviour in organisations; but a focus on individual decision-making denuded of the 
context in which offenders see Machiavellianism and narcissism as positive traits of 
business heroes seems misplaced. Galbraith observes that "legal self-enrichment in the 
millions of dollars is a common feature of modern corporate government" (2004, p. 27). 
Numerous examples in his book "The Economics of Innocent Fraud", based on the 
assumption that there is a gap between the predominant opinion and the truth,   illustrate 
the manner in which fraudulent practices become respectable, legitimate and even 
institutionalized." 
 
4. The paper notes that despite various pressures and opportunities, some individuals do 
not succumb to fraudulent practices whilst others do. Why might that be the case? Is it 
anything to do with the moral development of the individual (see Kohlberg, 1981)? A 
consideration of this would enable the paper to expand understanding of the motivations 
and rationalizations for fraud. 
 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 4 (particularly relevant: Discussion): Moreover, an 
inclusion of psychological aspects may expand our understanding of the motivations and 
rationalizations for fraud. Kohlberg's approach (1981) is based upon the assumption  that 
moral development is essential for an individual's behaviour. Levels of moral reasoning 
are developed in the same sequence, depending on several criteria such as the ability to 
project one's self into the other's perspective, though not everyone reach the highest 
moral reasoning. More norm-infringing forms of egregious fraud are more 
  
difficult to justify morally to all but the most sociopathic, hence, independent of the risks 
of intervention by organisational controls, less likely to happen." 
 
5. It would be helpful to have some background information about the interviewees 
(page 6), e.g. their gender, age, occupation, organizational positions, industry, etc. How 
do their reflections compare to what they said during their trials? It may be argued that 
the interviewees enacted a kind of performance for the authors rather than revealing 
their innermost thoughts to strangers. How did the authors deal with the performance 
part of the interviews? Why should we treat the interviews as knowledge? 
 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 5 (particularly relevant: Methods): Whereas 
Cressey and other researchers examined white-collar criminals in prison (e.g. Benson, 
1984; Klenowski et al., 2010; Spencer, 1959; Willott et al., 2001; and others), all our 
interviews were carried out with 13 fraudsters who already had been released or who 
never did any jail time, though all eleven male and two female offenders were convicted 
by a Swiss or Austrian court. 
 
With high professional standing and respectability – former and still active managing 
directors, partners, owners or CEOs of large firms as well as other senior executives or 
accountants at highest management levels, politicians, and supervisory board members –, our respondents correspond to the traditional white-collar criminal stereotype: 
middle-aged white male, wealthy, well educated, no previous criminal record, and a stable 
employment in a white-collar position (ACFE, 2009; Croall, 2001; Weisburd et al., 1991). 
This is why we call our fraudsters "high profile" or "elite" (Stephens, 2007); and their 
victims also were usually large and famous organisations for which they have worked. 
(Indeed a few fraudsters are still working for their organisation, which had previously 
been their victim). Moreover, their combined crimes caused a direct loss of several 
hundred million Swiss Francs or Euros. A stringent obligation to observe confidentiality, 
as well as the empirical problem of drawing conclusions make us careful to avoid more 
background information about the interviewees. 
 
We were aware of the risk that interviewees could enact a kind of performance for us 
rather than revealing their thoughts to strangers. Though this risk cannot be entirely 
excluded, measures were taken to keep this to a minimum, via a private and tension-free 
interview environment. No model can eliminate respondent bias from retrospection and 
concern about how direct observers will view the morality of their conduct (Levi, 2008). 
All fraudsters volunteered to participate in one to one conversations at a time and place 
of their choice, usually in the afternoon at a café. There was no surveillance from prison 
officers behind closed doors, which may distort the collected data material. The 
respondents were informed comprehensively in advance about the purpose, scope and 
aims of the inquiry as well as anything else requested. Before the interview, the 
perpetrators received a signed university letter, which have assurances of anonymity. 
Furthermore, some small talk increased rapport and made the atmosphere comfortable 
for this sensitive issue. The interviewee was told that s/he could feel free to skip 
particularly distressing questions but none did so; everyone voluntarily answered all 
questions. The questionnaire includes recurring but reformulated questions to support 
the verification of whether an answer was evasive or deceitful. In total, systematic errors 
or inconsistencies in the transcribed interviews are very rare. Considering the careful 
planning and preparation as well as the serious attitude of our respondents, we assume 
a negligible effect on the answers." 
  
6. The Fraud Diamond makes a somewhat abrupt appearance on page 15. If its elements 
are relevant to the study then they should be woven into the theory section. The brief 
discussion is too cryptic. My recollection is that Wolfe and Hermanson's notion of 
capability covers position/function, brains, confidence/ego, coercion skills, effective 
lying and immunity to stress. I could not see all these elements either in the interview 
data or the discussion. It would be helpful to have some clarity. 
 
It might be useful to consider diagrams to explain the difference between the fraud 
diamond and fraud triangle. 
 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 6 (particularly relevant: Introduction): Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004) expand the FT to a quadrangle named Fraud Diamond by including 
an additional element: The capability to commit fraud. The Fraud Diamond or alternative 
models, e.g. the fraud scale, the triangle of fraud action, M.I.C.E. etc. (Albrecht et al., 1984; 
Dorminey et al., 2012; Kranacher et al., 2011) are not relevant to this work." 
 
7. Whist the research is interesting, but its usefulness may be limited. All work of the kind 
is ex-post and is always full of caveats too (e.g. not everyone succumbs to the pressures 
or opportunities for fraud). Therefore, its implications for auditors, the design of internal 
controls and law enforcement agencies are fuzzy. 
 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 7 (particularly relevant: Methods): Yes, our results 
have to be handled with some caution. First, our empirical contribution is limited to 
detected high-profile offenders in Switzerland and Austria. Second, the explanations of 
offending are based on an analysis of ex-post verbalisation (possibly suitably modified 
for audiences even in private) and "may involve appeal to a vocabulary of motives" (Mills, 
1940, p. 907), which could be pre-formed for a specific group. And finally, even though 
we do not intend to test the FT (except inasmuch as we are testing its universal 
applicability), our sample size is too small to formulate a defensible universally 
applicable hypothesis. External white-collar (or "organised") criminals operating non- 
collusively outside an organisation (e.g. tax or credit card fraudsters, clandestine 
workers etc.) or undiscovered perpetrators are not considered at all. Given the role that 
Austrian and Swiss banks and other professionals have played as facilitators of money 
laundering and tax evasion, this is a limitation." 
 
8. As the paper calls for "intensifying the dialogue with criminological research" (p. 15) 
and claims that the study has "potentially important implications", it would be helpful to 
have some pointers. What would this dialogue and the study do for accounting research, 
education, public policies, corporate governance, investigation of frauds, sentencing 
fraudsters, etc.? 
 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 8 (particularly relevant: Discussion): To enhance 
clarity regarding the causes of white-collar crime, in particular in the corporate context, 
is a problem for researchers, as noted by scientists from various fields (Gobert & Punch, 
2007; and others). Cresseyǯs nearly 60 year old vehicle, the FT, based on a sample of 
embezzlers persists as a sacrosanct benchmark and from an accounting perspective, 
appears as a general theory of financial crime due to its dominant position in fraud 
standards. Granted, as is usually the case with models, the FT does still offer an 
incomplete but useful abstraction of complex interactions, it nevertheless neglects the 
  
impact of social systems on individual decisions to commit fraud. Greater importance 
arguably should be attached to a discipline of the social sciences, where fraud has a long- 
established place in research: criminology. New approaches allow alternative insights to 
post-fraud interventions, e. g. effective sanctioning of perpetrators to avoid recidivism and 
increase general deterrence, and to fraud prevention, e. g. in terms of shaping internal and 
external corporate governance, and the legitimacy of controls. To enrich the fraud 
accounting research, education and practice, we suggest intensifying the dialogue with 
criminological research, including that which problematises the professional and social 
construction of fraud." 
 
9. The purpose of footnote 1 is not clear. Is it at the right place? 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 9: Revised" 
10. . Page 2 refers to "methodological background", but the section is primarily 
about methods rather than methodology which is a much bigger issue. 
 
"Response to Reviewer comment No. 10: Revised" 
